I've been working in the media and model IP space for quite many years. What this article misses a bit is the threat model for watermarking in general.
Watermarking and fingerprinting have inherently weak security guarantees -- they rely a lot on security through obscurity, weak assumed adversaries to deliver.
There are clear trade offs between true positives, false positives and maintaining the quality of the media. It's true for audio-visual media, models and their outputs alike.
As much as I like to take shots at poor technical choices by corps and govs, this one is unjustified. Sure, inserting glyphs is bad but biased sampling is as good as it gets in 2026.
Watermarking and fingerprinting have inherently weak security guarantees -- they rely a lot on security through obscurity, weak assumed adversaries to deliver.
There are clear trade offs between true positives, false positives and maintaining the quality of the media. It's true for audio-visual media, models and their outputs alike.
As much as I like to take shots at poor technical choices by corps and govs, this one is unjustified. Sure, inserting glyphs is bad but biased sampling is as good as it gets in 2026.
EDIT: grammar